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Abstract
In settings of incomplete information, we put forward
(1) a very conservative —indeed, purely set-theoretic— model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones)
that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and
(2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such
conservative beliefs.
We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that,
under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good,
always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue
benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater.
By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor,
under classical solution concepts.
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present version is under review at the Journal of Economic Theory (special issue dedicated to the interface between economics
and computer science).
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1 Introduction
We focus on settings of incomplete information. Here, a player i knows precisely θi, his own (payoff) type,
but not θ−i, the type subprofile of his opponents. Accordingly, he may have all kinds of beliefs (even wrong
ones) about θ−i. We refer to such beliefs as i’s external beliefs, and to θi as his internal knowledge.
For achieving a desired goal, a mechanism designer should in general consider leveraging both the players’
internal knowledge and their external beliefs. Mechanisms working in dominant or undominated strategies
leverage the former, but not the latter.1 Mechanisms using Bayesian Nash equilibrium as their underlying
solution concept leverage both, but assume that the type profile θ is drawn from a distribution D that is
(commonly) known to the players.
Independent of any additional assumptions (e.g., assumptions about the relationships among the players’
individual beliefs), modeling a player i’s own belief about the actual type profile θ as a distribution Di
imposes significant constraints. It is true that we focus on settings of incomplete information, and it is also
true that modeling uncertainty by distributions is a traditional choice. Yet, we should always be cognizant
that this traditional choice constitutes a strong assumption. A distribution Di is a very structured form of
incomplete information. In particular, it presupposes that player i can precisely compare any possible pair
of type profiles θ′ and θ′′, and determine —say— that θ′ is 3.2718 times more likely than θ′′. Often, however,
i may not have such structured beliefs. In a single-good auction, i may value the item for sale for 50 and
believe that one of his opponents values for more than 100. Such a belief is not a distribution: indeed, i may
not know whom such a high-valuing player might be, nor what the probabilities for his valuation being 101,
102, etc. might be. Such belief is not leverageable by Bayesian mechanisms, but it would be nice to be able
to leverage it too, somehow.
In sum, classical mechanisms exploit two extremes, (1) the players have no external beliefs and (2) the
players’ external beliefs consist of probability distributions, but not the vast ground in between. Personally,
we consider the first extreme as too pessimistic and the second as too optimistic, and wish to explore a
“middle road” to mechanism design.
Our Contributions in a Nutshell We introduce a set-theoretic model for the beliefs that a player may
have about his opponents. Our model is very conservative. In sharp contrast with the Bayesian setting, we
do not even assume that there exist a player i and a pair of type subprofiles for his opponents such that i
can tell which of the two subprofiles is more “likely” than the other.
As unstructured as such beliefs may be, we prove that it is possible to design mechanisms that successfully
leverage them. Indeed, for single-good auctions we (1) define a new revenue benchmark that is always greater
than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much higher, and (2) show that this new
benchmark can be guaranteed, by a simple mechanism, even when the designer has no information about the
players’ valuations or their beliefs.
Our mechanism only assumes the players’ mutual (as opposed to “common”) belief of rationality. The
exact formalization of our solution concept, conservative strict implementation, is of independent interest.
Indeed, we have been able to use it for other goals in other settings.
We also prove that our new revenue benchmark cannot even be meaningfully approximated under classical
solution concepts, such as implementation in undominated strategies (and thus implementation in dominant
strategies), or implementation in ex-post equilibrium. These impossibility results hold even if the designer
is allowed to leverage the players’ beliefs (e.g., via richer strategy spaces than those traditionally envisaged).
Indeed, they hold because of the inability of classical solution concepts to leverage mutual belief of rationality.
Finally, we propose to enlarge the traditional definition of social choice correspondences so as to allow
them to depend also on the players’ beliefs, and not just on their types. This gives a mechanism designer a
richer and meaningful set of “targets”, possibly enabling him to “jump over higher bars”.
1Whenever such mechanisms exist, they achieve their goals no matter what external beliefs the players may have.
1
Finiteness While our belief model and solution concept are very general, our theorems focus solely on
single-good auctions where all valuations are non-negative integers upperbounded by some value V , and all
mechanisms provide each player with a finite number of pure strategies.
2 Our Model
2.1 The Conservative-Belief Model
Definition 1. A conservative context C consists of a tuple (n,Ω,Θ, u, θ,B), where
• (n,Ω,Θ, u, θ) is a traditional context of incomplete information,2 and
• B is a profile such that, for each player i, (1) Bi ⊆ Θ and (2) ti = θi for all t ∈ Bi.
We refer to B as the conservative belief profile, and say that Bi is correct if θ ∈ Bi.
In a conservative context, Bi represents all possible candidates for the true type profile in player i’s view.
(We do not include the players’ higher-level beliefs in our contexts because our solution concept prevents
such beliefs from affecting a rational play of our mechanism.)
Knowledge and Beliefs Components n, Ω, Θ, and u are common knowledge to everyone. Each player
i individually knows θi and Bi, is rational, and believes that his opponents are rational. (Any unspecified
knowledge and belief of players or mechanism designers can be chosen arbitrarily.)
Important Clarifications
1. Conservative Beliefs Always Exist. The conservative-belief profile is a model rather than an assumption.
As usual, a player i knows θi, but we make no requirement about his external belief. For instance, he
may have no external belief whatsoever. In this case, Bi = Θ1 × · · · × Θi−1 × {θi} × Θi+1 × · · · × Θn.
On the other extreme, he may have no external uncertainty whatsoever. In this case, Bi = {t} for some
type profile t (not necessarily equal to θ).3
2. Players’ beliefs can be wrong. Indeed it may even be the case that θ 6∈ Bi for each player i.
3. Compatibility with Additional Beliefs. The profile B is compatible with the players having additional
beliefs, even of a probabilistic nature, such as partial distributions. For example, a player i may believe
that the probability of another player j’s valuation being 100 is between 1/3 and 2/3. In no case,
however, can these additional beliefs contradict B. For instance, if a player i believes that the true type
profile has been drawn from some distribution D, then Bi should coincide with D’s support.
Let us stress that our mechanisms leverage B in order to achieve their goals, but work no matter what
additional beliefs (compatible with B) the players might have.
4. External Beliefs and Payoff Types. Relative to B, the external belief of a player i, Ei, is formally defined
to be the set {t−i : (θi, t−i) ∈ Bi}. As a player i’s type is a comprehensive description of i in the strategic
situation at hand, we are essentially separating i’s payoff type, θi, from his external-belief type, Ei.
Conservative Single-Good Auction Contexts A conservative single-good auction context is a conser-
vative context (n,Ω,Θ, u, θ,B) where: Θ = {0, 1, . . . , V }n for some positive integer V referred to as the
valuation bound; Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n}×Rn;4 and each utility function ui is so defined: ui(ti, (a, P )) equals ti−Pi
if i = a, and −Pi otherwise.
2That is, {1, . . . , n} is the set of players; Ω the set of outcomes; Θ = Θ1×· · ·×Θn the set of all possible (payoff) type profiles;
u the profile of utility functions, each ui mapping Θi × Ω to R, the set of reals; and θ ∈ Θ the profile of true types. If ti ∈ Θi
and ω a distribution over Ω, then ui(ti, ω) is the expectation induced by ω.
3If the context were one of complete information, then necessarily Bi = {θ} for all i.
4In an outcome (a, P ), a denotes the player getting the good if > 0, or that the good is unallocated if = 0; and P denotes the
price profile.
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If ω = (a, P ) ∈ Ω, then player i’s utility for ω, ui(ω), is ui(θi, ω); and the revenue of ω, REV (ω), is
∑
i Pi.
We denote by C Vn the set of all conservative single-good auction contexts with n players and valuation bound
V , and by DVn the set of all contexts in C
V
n where the conservative belief of every player is correct.
Remarks
• Working solely in our model, we may drop the term “conservative” or use it for emphasis/clarity only.
Further, since all auctions we consider are single-good, we may also omit the term “single-good.”
• An auction context C is identified by n, V , θ and B alone: that is, C = (n, V, θ,B).
• In an auction context, a player i’s true type θi —also called i’s true valuation— represents i’s value for
the good for sale, and i’s conservative belief Bi is a set of non-negative integer profiles.
• In the discussion below, given an underlying context, θ always represents the true type profile, while a
type profile t can be an arbitrary element in a player’s conservative belief Bi.
2.2 Conservative-Belief Social Choice Correspondences and Their Advantages
Traditionally, social choice correspondences map type profiles to sets of (distributions over) outcomes, but
can be naturally extended to map conservative-belief profiles to sets of outcomes. This extension strictly
enriches the set of “targets” for mechanism design. As noted, each context C implicitly has a conservative-
belief profile B, from which the true type profile θ could be easily computed. Thus, for each traditional
correspondence f there exists an extended correspondence F such that f(θ) = F (B), but not vice versa.
The advantage of a meaningful and enlarged “target space” is pretty clear. Very often we do not know
how to design mechanisms implementing a given, traditional, social choice correspondence f . Sometimes we
can actually prove that designing such mechanisms is impossible (at least for some type of implementation
—e.g., in dominant strategies). In these cases, while one can always shop around for new, meaningful, and
achievable targets among traditional social choice correspondences, extended social choice correspondences
provide access to additional targets, which are more tractable, reasonable, but not expressible in terms of θ
alone. For instance, in [8] we prove the existence of a very robust mechanism that, in any truly combinatorial
auction and without any knowledge about the players’ true valuations, generates within a factor of 2 the
“maximum revenue that a player could guarantee if he were charged to sell the goods to his competitors by
means of take-it-or-leave-it offers.”
In this paper, instead of using conservative beliefs for achieving a social choice correspondence “tamer”
than classical ones, we use them for (introducing and then) achieving a “tougher” one.
2.3 The Second-Belief Revenue Benchmark
In auction contexts, a revenue benchmark F is a function mapping each conservative belief profile B to a real
number. Thus, de facto, F is a social choice correspondence: the one mapping each B to the set of outcomes
whose revenue is at least F (B).5 Let us now define a revenue benchmark for single-good auctions.
Definition 2. The second-belief benchmark, denoted by 2nd, is the revenue benchmark so defined. Relative
to given a belief profile B, for every player i let the sure maximum price according to the belief of i be
smpi , mint∈Bi maxj tj. Then, 2nd(B) is the second highest value in {smp1, . . . , smpn}.
If t were the true valuation profile, then maxj tj would be the maximum price that a player is willing
to pay for the good. Thus, relative to Bi, smpi is the maximum price for which player i is sure that some
player (possibly i or a player whose identity is not precisely known to i) is willing to pay for the good.
5Notice that we are slightly overloading the notation F here and in the previous subsection. When talking about a generic
context F is a social-choice correspondence and F (B) is a set of outcomes, and when talking about generating revenue in single-
good auctions F is a revenue benchmark and F (B) is a real number. Such overloading will not cause any ambiguity since in our
discussion it is always clear whether we are talking about a general context or single-good auctions.
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A Simple Example Consider an auction with three players where θ = (100, 80, 60) and
B1 = {(100, x, y) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0}, B2 = {(100, 80, x), (y, 80, 100) : x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0}, and B3 = {(150, 0, 60)}.
Here, the beliefs of players 1 and 2 are correct, but that of player 3 is wrong. Player 1 has no external beliefs:
in his eyes, all valuations are possible for his two opponents. Player 2 believes that either player 1 or player
3 has valuation 100, but cannot tell whom. Player 3 has no external uncertainty: in his eyes, (150, 0, 60) is
the true valuation profile. According to B, smp1 = smp2 = 100, smp3 = 150, and thus 2nd(B) = 100, which
in this specific case happens to be the highest valuation.
Remark Sometimes 2nd(B) can exceed the highest valuation, but never when all beliefs are correct. How-
ever, since smpi ≥ θi for every player i, it is always the case that “2nd(B) ≥ 2nd(θ)”: that is, our benchmark
is always greater than or equal to the second highest true valuation. Accordingly, a mechanism designer
concerned with generating revenue should try to achieve the second-belief benchmark instead of using the
second-price mechanism to generate revenue equal to the second-highest valuation. If he succeeds, the seller
may have something (possibly a lot) to gain and nothing to lose.
As we prove, however, this more demanding benchmark cannot be achieved via classical solution concepts.
3 Statement and Discussion of Our Results
3.1 The Impossibility of Classically Implementing the Second-Belief Benchmark
Recall that a mechanism M provides each player i with a set of pure strategies, consistently denoted by
Si in this paper, and maps each strategy profile σ to an outcome (or a distribution over outcomes, if M is
probabilistic or σ a mixed-strategy profile) denoted by M(σ). Also recall that a mechanism is finite if each
Si is finite, and that a game G consists of a context C and a mechanism M : G = (C,M). Finally, when the
mechanism M is clear, for any strategy profile σ, we may denote ui(M(σ)) by ui(σ) for short.
For our impossibility results, we consider mechanisms that allow the players to “stay home”, that is, to
opt out of the auction. Otherwise, one could trivially and meaninglessly generate high revenue by forcing
the players to participate in an auction mechanism always giving them very negative utility.
Definition 3. A mechanism M is reasonable if it is finite and satisfies the following opt-out condition:
∀ player i ∃outi ∈ Si such that for (any possible true type θi and) any strategy subprofile s−i ∈ S−i,
ui(M(outi, s−i)) = 0.
Remarks
• Having the opt-out condition requiring i’s utility to be 0 in expectation, rather than for every outcome
in the support of M(outi, s−i), can only make our impossibility results stronger.
• Our impossibility results already hold for auctions with just two players, and when all beliefs are correct.
Actually, when the players’ beliefs are not correct these results become trivial.6 Accordingly, we state
our impossibility results in terms of DVn instead of C
V
n .
• In our impossibility results we never assume any restrictions on the strategy spaces. In particular, our
results also apply to normal-form mechanisms that let the players report their (alleged) conservative
beliefs, as it is fair to do so when trying to leverage them.
6This is so because, when more than one player’s beliefs are not correct, it is trivial to construct contexts for which the
second-belief benchmark is much greater than the highest valuation. And no classical notion of implementation can guarantee
revenue greater than the highest valuation.
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3.1.1 Impossibility of Implementation in Undominated Strategies
Implementation in undominated strategies is a classical notion for settings of incomplete information.7 We
strengthen our first impossibility result by adopting a weaker notion of such implementation.8 Notice that
this weaker notion is already sufficient from a mechanism designer’s point of view.
Definition 4. A mechanism M sufficiently implements a revenue benchmark F for a class C of auction
contexts in undominated strategies if, ∀ contexts C ∈ C and ∀ profiles s of undominated strategies in the
game (C,M), denoting by B the belief profile of C, we have that
REV (M(s)) ≥ F (B).
Theorem 1. ∀ ∈ (1/2, 1] and ∀ V > d 1−1/2e, no reasonable mechanism sufficiently implements 2nd for
DV2 in undominated strategies.
For deterministic mechanisms and purely undominated strategies, our impossibility result holds for arbi-
trary approximation factors.
Theorem 2. ∀ ∈ (0, 1] and ∀ V > d1/e, no reasonable deterministic mechanism sufficiently implements
2nd for DV2 in purely undominated strategies.
We prove Theorem 1 in Section 5. The proof of Theorem 2 is similar (and simpler), and thus omitted.
3.1.2 Impossibility of Implementation in Dominant Strategies
Theorems 1 and 2 immediately yield the following about strictly/weakly/very weakly dominant strategies.9
Corollary 1. ∀ ∈ (1/2, 1] and ∀ V > d 1−1/2e, no reasonable mechanism implements 2nd for DV2 in
strictly/weakly dominant strategies or in (all) very weakly dominant strategies.
Corollary 2. ∀ ∈ (0, 1] and ∀ V > d1/e, no reasonable deterministic mechanism implements 2nd for DV2
in strictly/weakly dominant strategies or in (all) very weakly dominant strategies.
3.1.3 A Crucial Clarification
Note that, in the absence of Theorems 1 and 2, the above two corollaries would be trivial if the players
were restricted to bid valuations only. In such a case, in fact, the second-price mechanism is “the only”
(weakly) dominant-strategy mechanism for auctions of a single good. And since the revenue it generates is
precisely equal to the second-highest valuation, no other dominant-strategy mechanism can generate second-
belief revenue. “QED.” We thus wish to emphasize again that all our impossibility results hold without
any restrictions on strategy spaces, and in particular that a mechanism asking the players to announce
conservative beliefs cannot be “simulated” by one asking them to announce only valuations.
By allowing arbitrary strategy spaces, we explicitly allow the designer to leverage each player’s external
beliefs. However, as Theorems 1 and 2 show, when the designer does not leverage the players’ mutual belief
of rationality, he cannot hope to even approximate our benchmark.
7Given a game G = (C,M), a strategy si of player i is weakly dominated by another (possibly mixed) strategy σi if ui(σi, s−i) ≥
ui(si, s−i) for every strategy subprofile s−i of the others, and ui(σi, s′−i) > ui(si, s
′
−i) for some strategy subprofile s
′
−i. A strategy
si is undominated if it is not weakly dominated by any strategy. A strategy si is purely undominated if it is not weakly dominated
by any pure strategy. Thus, to compute his own undominated strategies in a game, a player needs not have any information
about his opponents’ (payoff) types.
8Note that the traditional notion of (full) implementation in undominated strategies —see Jackson [20]— requires not only
that every profile of undominated strategies yields an outcome satisfying the desired social choice correspondence, but also that,
conversely, for each desired outcome there exists a profile of undominated strategies yielding that outcome. By removing the
latter requirement we weaken the notion of implementation and thus strengthen the impossibility result of Theorem 1.
9A strategy si of player i is strictly dominant if for every other strategy s
′
i, ui(si, s−i) > ui(s
′
i, s−i) for every strategy subprofile
s−i. Strategy si is weakly dominant if for every other strategy s′i, ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for every s−i, and the inequality is
strict for some s−i. Strategy si is very weakly dominant if for every other strategy s′i, ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for every s−i.
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3.1.4 Extra Fragility of Implementation at Some Ex-Post/Very Weakly Dominant Equilibria
A mechanism guaranteeing a given property at some equilibria of a given type is certainly more fragile than
one guaranteeing it at all equilibria of that type. Indeed, one has no control over the equilibrium ultimately
selected by the players. But mechanisms implementing 2nd at some ex-post or very weakly dominant
equilibria have some extra fragility. Consider the following mechanism for C 1002 .
MechanismNaive. A strategy of player i has two components: an integer ai and a set bi ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , 100}.
(Allegedly, ai is player i’s true valuation, and bi his true external belief.) The winner and prices are
decided as follows. Let w = argmaxi ai (ties broken lexicographically), and let P = mint∈B′−w maxj tj
where B′−w = {a−w} × b−w. If aw ≥ P , then the good is sold to player w, w pays P , and his opponent
pays 0. Else, the good is unsold and both players pay 0.
According to Naive, it is clear that every player announcing his true valuation and true external belief
in every context is an ex-post equilibrium. When the players’ beliefs are correct, this equilibrium guarantees
second-belief revenue. However, consider the context C where
θ = (70, 100), B1 = {(70, x) : x ≥ 90}, and B2 = {(x, 100) : x ≥ 60}.
In this context, all beliefs are correct, 2nd(B) = 90, the truthful ex-post equilibrium yields the strategy profile
((70, {x : x ≥ 90}), (100, {x : x ≥ 60})), and it generates revenue 90 as desired. However, it is also clear that
((70, {x : x ≥ 0}), (100, {x : x ≥ 60})) is an alternative Nash equilibrium —corresponding to another ex-post
equilibrium— whose revenue is only 70.
In principle —e.g., when two Nash equilibria differ at multiple players, one can argue that a player may
be able to establish some belief about which equilibrium is going to be played out by the others, and best
respond to his belief. But in the above example, the “truthful” and the “alternative” equilibria differ only at
player 1’s strategy. Thus, even if player 1 believed that player 2 will play his truthful strategy, it would also
be perfectly rational for player 1 to play his own alternative strategy. Viceversa, even if player 2 believed
that player 1 will play his alternative strategy, it would also be perfectly rational for player 2 to stick to his
own truthful strategy (which coincides with his alternative one in the above example).
Accordingly, which revenue should we expect from Naive for context C? The answer is 90 if player 1 is
“generous” towards the seller and 70 otherwise.10 In Appendix A, we formalize this phenomenon and prove,
in Theorems 4 and 5, that such extra fragility is actually unavoidable for any mechanism implementing (or
even approximating) the second-belief benchmark at some ex-post or very weakly dominant equilibria.
Clarification Although very weakly dominant equilibrium and ex-post equilibrium are very related notions,
and sometimes one implies the other, there are games where they are not the same (see Appendix ?).
Accordingly, our fragility theorems are explicitly stated for both.
3.2 Our New Solution Concept
The inability of achieving the second-belief benchmark via classical notions of implementation encourages
us to develop a new one. Intuitively, but erroneously, our notion can be taken to consist of “two-round
elimination of strictly dominated strategies” (hardly a new solution concept!). The problem is that such
elimination is not well defined in a setting of incomplete information: without knowing his opponents’ payoff
types, a player is not capable of figuring out what strategies are left for them after the first round, and thus
10Notice that the truthful ex-post equilibrium actually specifies a very weakly dominant strategy for each player in each
context, and thus illustrates the lack of robustness for implementation at some very weakly dominant equilibria as well. Such
lack of robustness was already pointed out by Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato theoretically [24] and by Casona, Saijo, Sjostrom, and
Yamato experimentally [6]. In [24] the authors also propose secure implementation: essentially, implementation via mechanisms
ensuring that (a) each player has a very weakly dominant strategy, and that (b) the desired property holds at all Nash equilibria
(and thus all very weakly dominant ones). As we have discussed, therefore, the second-belief revenue benchmark is not securely
implementable.
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is not capable of figuring out which of his own strategies are dominated in the second round. Therefore we
must be more careful.
Sketch of Our Notion Our notion is formally defined in Section 6, but can be summarized as follows.
We say that a normal-form mechanismM conservatively strictly implements a social choice correspondence
F for a class of contexts C if, for any context C ∈ C , denoting by B the belief profile of C, we have
M(s) ∈ F (B) for any strategy profile s surviving the following two-step elimination procedure:
1. Each player eliminates all of his strictly dominated strategies;
2. Based on his conservative belief Bi, and assuming that everyone completes Step 1, each player i elimi-
nates all his remaining strategies that are dominated relative to Bi.
The real novelty of our notion, and the key for meaningfully leveraging set-theoretic beliefs, lie with properly
defining “domination relative to Bi” in Step 2. As usual, after Step 1, to determine which of his remaining
strategies are dominated, i should know what are the currently surviving strategies of the other players.
However, to figure this out, player i must also know what are the true types of the other players —which is
precisely a piece of information that he does not have in a setting of incomplete information. We address
this concern by breaking down Step 2 into two conceptual sub-steps as follows.
2.1 Each player i, for each type profile t in Bi, computes the profile S(t), where each S(t)j represents the
set of surviving strategies for player j after Step 1, if t were the true type profile.
2.2 Each player i eliminates a Step-1 surviving strategy si if and only if there exists another (possibly mixed)
Step-1 surviving strategy σi that (classically) strictly dominates si with respect to S(t) for each t ∈ Bi.
Remark Let us emphasize a subtle point hidden in Step 2.2. Consider the following two ways of defining
si to be “dominated relative to Bi”:
(i) for each t ∈ Bi, si is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by some σi, and
(ii) for each t ∈ Bi, si is strictly dominated with respect to S(t) by the same σi.
Although both ways are based on the players’ set-theoretic beliefs B, we have adopted the latter one. The
reason is that, when he eliminates a strategy si dominated according to (ii), player i is sure to have a better
strategy to play, namely σi, no matter which type profile in Bi might be the right one. But the same is not
true when he eliminates a strategy dominated according to (i).
Example11 Consider a mechanism M played by two players, where the true type profile is θ = (θ1, θ2),
and the belief of player 1 is B1 = {(θ1, θ2), (θ1, θ′2)}. (Since we are going to analyze only player 1’s behavior,
we do not need to specify B2 nor the other possible type profiles.) The mechanism gives player 1 the pure
strategies a, b, and c, and player 2 the pure strategies d and e. For each type profile in B1, the players’
utilities under M are as follows.
(θ1, θ2) (θ1, θ
′
2)
HHHHH1
2
d e
a 2,0 2,1
b -100,0 3,1
c 3,0 -100,1
HHHHH1
2
d e
a 2,1 2,0
b -100,1 3,0
c 3,1 -100,0
Notice that, in Step 1 of our notion, player 1 cannot eliminate any strategy. Player 2 instead would
eliminate d (strictly dominated by e) if his true type were θ2, and e (strictly dominated by d) if his true type
were θ′2. Let us now consider Step 2. If we adopted definition (i) in Step 2.2, then player 1 should eliminate
strategy a, because it is strictly dominated by b with respect to his candidate type profile (θ1, θ2), and by c
with respect to his other candidate type profile (θ1, θ
′
2). However, whether player 1 should play b or c in place
of a really depends on whether (θ1, θ2) or (θ1, θ
′
2) is the true type profile. If he makes the wrong choice, then
11We thank Paul Valiant for this example.
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his loss is huge compared with his possible gain: namely, -100 versus 3. Without any “likelihood” associated
with each candidate type profile in his belief B1, it might be reasonable and safer for player 1 to use a to
always get utility 2. (Thus, if M banked on player 1 not choosing a in order to implement its desired social
choice correspondence, it may not implement it in a robust sense.)
Mutual Belief of Rationality Implementation in dominant or undominated strategies only requires that
every player is rational. Conservative strict implementation instead additionally requires that every player
believes that his opponents are rational. However, it does not require “higher-level” beliefs of rationality, let
alone common belief. That is,
Conservative strict implementation solely relies on rationality and mutual belief of rationality.
In essence, our notion is only “slightly” weaker than implementation in strictly dominant strategies, yet
is defined carefully to explicitly leverage the players’ beliefs about others in a robust way.
3.3 The Second-Belief Benchmark is Conservatively Strictly Implementable
Finally, we prove that conservative strict implementation succeeds where classical notions fail. Namely, under
our solution concept, we exhibit a mechanismM, the second–belief mechanism, that guarantees second-belief
revenue, within an arbitrarily small additive value , in all single-good auction contexts. Our mechanism is
uniformly specified for all values , numbers of players n, and valuation bounds V : M =M,n,V . Formally,
Theorem 3. For any  ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , M,n,V conservatively strictly implements 2nd −  for C Vn .
The second-belief mechanism is defined in Section 7 and analyzed in Section 8. In Section 9 we address
three concerns raised about our mechanism.
4 Related Work
In Bayesian settings with a common prior, higher revenue benchmarks can be guaranteed, and, more generally,
more social choice functions can be implemented, under proper assumptions.12 These works are not very
relevant to ours, since we focus on a non-probabilistic model of incomplete information, and we do not
impose any common knowledge assumption about the players’ beliefs. Let us instead recall other works,
where probabilistic/common-prior assumptions have been substantially relaxed.
Other Models of Incomplete Information Postlewaite and Schmeidler [23] studied differential infor-
mation settings for exchange economies. They model a player’s uncertainty as a partition of the set of all
possible states of the world, and assume such partitions to be common knowledge. In our case, we do not as-
sume a player to have any knowledge/beliefs about the knowledge/beliefs of another player, and we certainly
do not have any common-knowledge requirements. In addition, they further assume that each player has
a probabilistic distribution over the state space, and use Bayesian equilibrium as the key solution concept.
Their model actually reduces to Harsanyi’s incomplete information model [17] if the state space is finite.
Chung and Ely [11] model a player’s belief about the state of the world via a distribution, but assume that
he prefers one outcome ω to another ω′ if he locally prefers ω to ω′ in every state that is possible according
to his belief. In this sense, what matters is the support of the distribution, which is set-theoretic. The
authors show that, even when the players only have very small uncertainty about the state of the world, the
set of social choice rules implementable at (essentially) undominated Nash equilibria is highly constrained
12For instance, Cremer and McLean [12] show that, for ceratin valuation distributions, revenue equal to the highest valuation
can be achieved in a single-good auction under Bayesian Nash equilibrium or in weakly dominant strategies. Also, Abreu and
Matsushima [2] show that, under some technical conditions, any Bayesian incentive compatible social-choice function can be
virtually implemented in iteratively undominated strategies.
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compared with that in complete-information settings. Their result is less relevant for settings, like ours,
where a player has no uncertainty about his own payoff type. In addition, in our purely set-theoretic model,
we have no requirement on how big a player’s uncertainty about his opponents can be. Finally, instead of
studying implementation at all equilibria (of a given type), we study the fragility of implementation even at
some of them.
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano [3] also model the players’ beliefs about each other via distributions.
But they assume that each player i’s belief about the others’ payoff types is from a subset Qi of the set of
all possible distributions, and that the Qi’s are common knowledge among the players. By doing so, they
assume that the players have some knowledge about each other’s first-order belief. They impose no constraint
on the players’ higher-order beliefs, and assume that no other player knows player i’s true first-order belief.
Their model is still different from ours. First of all, in our model a player’s belief is set-theoretic instead
of probabilistic. Second of all, we do not assume that the players have any knowledge about each other.
Moreover, their model implicitly assumes that the players’ knowledge about each other’s first-order belief
is correct —i.e., player i’s true first-order belief is from Qi, while in our model a player can have arbitrary,
perhaps totally wrong, beliefs about others. Finally, the social-choice functions studied in [3] are still defined
over the players’ payoff types rather than their beliefs.
Our model of external information is also related to other notions in decision theory. In particular, Knight
[21] and later Bewley [5] have considered players who have very incomplete information about their own type.
Specifically, a Knightian player i does not know his own type θi, nor the distribution Di from which θi has
been drawn. Rather, he knows several distributions, one of which is guaranteed to be Di. Recently Knightian
players have also been studied in mechanism design, in particular, by Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon [22] for
games with a single player, and by Chiesa, Micali, and Zhu [10] for auctions with multiple players.
Also, Hyafil and Boutilier [19] study regret-minimizing equilibria in games with multiple players having
set-theoretic beliefs about each other. But they assume that the players’ beliefs come from a common prior,
and are always correct. Our model does not make these assumptions.
Impossibility Results Several impossibility results have been proved for implementation in dominant
strategies: for instance, for many forms of elections (see Gibbard [13] and Sattherwaite [25]), for maximizing
social welfare in a budget-balanced way (see Green and Laffont [16] and Hurwicz [18]), and for maximizing
revenue in general settings of quasi-linear utilities (see Chen, Hassidim and Micali [7]). As for mechanisms
working in undominated strategies, Jackson [20] shows that the set of social choice correspondences (fully)
implementable by bounded mechanisms (which include finite ones) is quite constrained. We note, however,
that none of these results imply ours for implementing the second-belief benchmark in either dominant or
undominated strategies (indeed, our results do not require full implementation).
Prior-Free Mechanisms Prior-free mechanisms for auctions have also been investigated —in particular,
by Baliga and Vohra [4], Segal [26], and Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin, Saks, and Wright [15], although the
first two of them do not consider auctions of a single good. The term “prior-free” seems to suggest that this
approach be relevant to our set-theoretic setting, but things are quite different. For instance, all cited prior-
free mechanisms work in dominant strategies, and we have proved that no dominant-strategy mechanism can
even approximate our revenue benchmark. More generally, as for all mechanisms, prior-free ones must be
analyzed based on some underlying solution concept, and as long as they use one of the solution concepts we
prove inadequate for our benchmark, they would automatically fail to guarantee it.
Our Own Prior Work In [8] we studied mechanisms leveraging only (what we now call) external correct
beliefs, and, as already mentioned, constructed one such mechanism for truly combinatorial auctions. (This
mechanism would also work with incorrect external beliefs, but under a slightly different analysis.) In a later
work with Valiant [9], we were able to extend our combinatorial-auction mechanism so as to leverage also, to
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a moderate extent, the internal knowledge of the players.13 In neither of these two prior papers we proved
any impossibility results: given that no significant revenue guarantees were known for combinatorial auctions,
we were satisfied with achieving new, reasonable benchmarks. Perhaps interestingly, our prior mechanisms
were of extensive form, and we still do not know whether equivalent, normal-form ones exist.
5 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. ∀ ∈ (1/2, 1] and ∀ V > d 1−1/2e, no reasonable mechanism sufficiently implements 2nd for
DV2 in undominated strategies.
Proof. For sake of contradiction, assume that there exist a value  ∈ (1/2, 1], an integer V > d 1−1/2e, and a
reasonable (probabilistic) mechanism M that sufficiently implements 2nd for DV2 in undominated strategies.
To derive the desired contradiction, letting H be an integer such that
V ≥ H > 1
− 1/2 ,
we construct two games, G and G′, as follows.
1. G = (C,M), where C = (2, V, θ,B) with θ = (H, 0) and B1 = B2 = {(H, 0)}.
Note: C ∈ DV2 because all beliefs are correct, and 2nd(B) = H because smp1 = smp2 = H.
2. G′ = (C ′,M), where C ′ = (2, V, θ′,B′) with θ′ = (1, 0) and B′1 = B′2 = {(1, 0)}.
Note: C ′ ∈ DV2 and 2nd(B′) = 1.
After analyzing the (auxiliary) game G′, we derive our desired contradiction for G. To clarify the game to
which a given quantity refers, we shall use the superscripts G and G′.
Let UDG
′
= UDG
′
1 ×UDG
′
2 , where each UD
G′
i is player i’s set of undominated strategies in G
′. Then, by
hypothesis:
∀s′ ∈ UDG′ , REV (M(s′)) ≥ 2nd(B′) = . (1)
Denoting as usual by ∆(A) the set of probabilistic distributions over a set A, we now prove the following
statement:
∃ a strategy σ′1 ∈ ∆(UDG
′
1 ) such that ∀ strategy s2 of player 2, uG
′
1 (M(σ
′
1, s2)) ≥ 0. (2)
Because M satisfies the opt-out condition, player 1 has a strategy out1 such that u
G′
1 (M(out1, s2)) = 0 ∀s2.
If out1 ∈ UDG′1 then Statement 1 follows by taking σ′1 = out1. Otherwise, by the finiteness of M there exists
σ′1 ∈ ∆(UDG
′
1 ) such that out1 is weakly dominated by σ
′
1, which implies u
G′
1 (M(σ
′
1, s2)) ≥ uG
′
1 (M(out1, s2)) =
0 ∀s2, as desired.
Similarly, we have the following statement:
∃ a strategy σ′2 ∈ ∆(UDG
′
2 ) such that ∀ strategy s1 of player 1, uG
′
2 (M(s1, σ
′
2)) ≥ 0. (3)
Combining Statements 2 and 3, letting ω′ be the (possibly probabilistic) outcome M(σ′1, σ′2), and letting
p′i and EP
′
i respectively be the probability that player i gets the good and the expected price that i pays
according to ω′, we have that
uG
′
1 (ω
′) = p′1 − EP ′1 ≥ 0 and uG
′
2 (ω
′) = −EP ′2 ≥ 0. (4)
Because of Equation 1, and because σ′i ∈ ∆(UDG
′
i ) for each i, we have
REV (ω′) = EP ′1 + EP
′
2 ≥ . (5)
13The emphasis of [9] actually was the possibility of leveraging the internal knowledge of coalitions rather than individual ones.
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Combining Equations 4 and 5, we have
p′1 ≥ EP ′1 ≥ − EP ′2 ≥ . (6)
Let us now analyze game G. Notice that, under the strategy profile (σ′1, σ′2), the (possibly probabilistic)
outcome of M is still ω′ in game G. Accordingly, following Equation 6 we have that
uG1 (M(σ
′
1, σ
′
2)) = u
G
1 (ω
′) = p′1H − EP ′1 ≥ p′1H − p′1 ≥ (H − 1),
where the second inequality holds further because H > 1.
Let UDG = UDG1 × UDG2 , where each UDGi is player i’s set of undominated strategies in G. We now
argue that there exists a strategy σˆ1 ∈ ∆(UDG1 ) such that
uG1 (M(σˆ1, σ
′
2)) ≥ (H − 1). (7)
To see why Inequality 7 is true, notice that if σ′1 ∈ ∆(UDG1 ) then we can take σˆ1 = σ′1. Otherwise, for each
strategy s′1 which is in the support of σ′1 but not in UDG1 , there exists σ′′1 ∈ ∆(UDG1 ) weakly dominating s′1
in game G (again because M is finite). Thus, we can construct σˆ1 from σ
′
1 by replacing each such s
′
1 with the
corresponding σ′′1 , and the so constructed σˆ1 satisfies uG1 (M(σˆ1, σ′2)) ≥ uG1 (M(σ′1, σ′2)) ≥ (H−1), as desired.
Because θ2 = θ
′
2, we have that player 2’s set of undominated strategies is the same in G and G
′, and so
is his utility for each possible outcome. That is,
UDG2 = UD
G′
2 and u
G
2 (·) = uG
′
2 (·). (8)
Equations 3 and 8 directly imply the following statement:
σ′2 ∈ ∆(UDG2 ) and uG2 (M(σˆ1, σ′2)) ≥ 0. (9)
Let ω = M(σˆ1, σ
′
2), and let pi and EPi respectively be the probability that player i gets the good and the
expected price that i pays according to ω. Following Equation 7 and the inequality of Statement 9, we have
uG1 (ω) = p1H − EP1 ≥ (H − 1) and uG2 (ω) = −EP2 ≥ 0. (10)
Combining Equation 10 with the facts that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, 1/2 <  ≤ 1, and H > 1−1/2 , we have
REV (ω) = EP1 + EP2 ≤ EP1 ≤ p1H − (H − 1) = H(p1 − + 
H
) ≤ H(1− + 1
H
)
< H(1− + − 1/2) = H/2 < H.
Accordingly, there exists a strategy profile sˆ such that: (1) sˆ1 is in the support of σˆ1 and sˆ2 is in the
support of σ′2, which imply that sˆ ∈ UDG; and (2) REV (M(sˆ)) ≤ REV (ω) < H = 2nd(B). That is, we
have finally reached the desired contradiction against the hypothesis that M sufficiently implements 2nd for
DV2 in undominated strategies. Thus Theorem 1 holds.
6 Conservative Strict Implementation
The following two auxiliary definitions envisage a game with context C = (n,Ω,Θ, u, θ,B) and mechanism
M (whose strategy-profile set is denoted by S as usual).
Definition 5. Let i be a player, ti a type of i, and T = T1 × · · · × Tn a set of pure strategy profiles. Then,
• We say that a strategy si ∈ Ti is strictly ti-T -dominated by another strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ti), in symbols
si <
ti
T σi, if for all strategy subprofiles s−i ∈ T−i, ui(ti,M(si, s−i)) < ui(ti,M(σi, s−i)).
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• We denote by S(ti) the set of pure strategies of i that are not strictly ti-S-dominated, and, for any type
profile t, we set S(t) = S(t1)× · · · × S(tn) and S(t−i) = S(t1)× · · · × S(ti−1)× S(ti+1)× · · · × S(tn).
Accordingly, si is strictly dominated by σi in the traditional sense if si <
θi
S σi, and S(ti) represents the
strategies of i that would survive elimination of strictly dominated strategies (in the traditional sense) if his
true type were ti. Also note that, for any t ∈ Bi, S(ti) = S(θi), because ti = θi, while S(tj) and S(θj) may
be very different for j 6= i. Thus, in general S(t) 6= S(θ) for t 6= θ.
Definition 6. A strategy si ∈ S(θi) is conservatively strictly dominated if there exists another strategy
σi ∈ ∆(S(θi)) that strictly θi-S(t)-dominates si for all t ∈ Bi. Else, si is conservatively strictly rational.
We are now ready to formalize our notion of implementation.
Definition 7. We say that a mechanism M conservatively strictly implements a social choice corre-
spondence F for a class of contexts C if, for all contexts C ∈ C and for all profiles s of conservatively strictly
rational strategies in (C,M), denoting by B the belief profile of C, we have that M(s) ∈ F (B).
7 The Second-Belief Mechanism
For any  ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , the mechanism M,n,V is described below. Note that the mechanism applies to
any context in C Vn , and is of normal form because the players act simultaneously and only once: in Step 1.
Steps a through e are just “conceptual steps taken by the mechanism”. The expression “X := x” denotes
the operation that sets or resets variable X to value x.
Mechanism M,n,V
a: Set a := 0, and Pi := 0 for all players i.
Comment. Upon termination, after all proper resettings, (a, P ) will be the final outcome.
1: Each player i, publicly and simultaneously with the others, announces a pair (ei, vi) ∈ {0, 1}×{0, . . . , V }.
Comment. Allegedly, vi = smpi, and ei indicates whether i’s announcement is about his internal
knowledge (allegedly ei = 0 signifies that vi = θi), or about his external belief.
b: If vi = 0 for each i, then reset a to be a randomly chosen player, and halt.
c: Order the announced n pairs according to v1, . . . , vn decreasingly, breaking ties in favor of those with
ei = 0. If there are still ties among some pairs, then break them according to the corresponding players.
Comment. It does not matter whether the players are ordered lexicographically (increasingly or de-
creasingly), or according to some other way.
d: Set a to be the player corresponding to the first pair, and Pa := max{12 ,maxj 6=a vj}.
e: For each player i, Pi := Pi − δi, where δi = 4n
[
vi
1+vi
+ 1−ei
(1+V )2
]
.
Comment. Each player i receives a reward δi.
Remark
• Notice that M,n,V always sells the good.
• Non-negative Revenue. Notice that ifM,n,V halts in Step b then its revenue is 0. Otherwise, its revenue
equals the price charged to player a in Step d minus the total rewards given to the players in Step e.
Because for each player i the reward that i receives in Step e is δi <

4n(1 + 1) =

2n ≤ 12n , the total
rewards given to the players in Step e is at most 12 . Because the price charged to player a in Step d is
at least 12 , we have that M,n,V always has non-negative revenue.
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• Uniform Construction. As promised, it is clear thatM,n,V is uniformly and efficiently constructible on
inputs , n, and V . In addition, it is very simple. It essentially consists of the second-price mechanism
together with carefully designed rewards. In light of our impossibility results about implementing 2nd
under classical solution concepts, this simplicity suggests that conservative strict implementation can be
quite powerful.
• From Additive to Multiplicative . Notice that the reward each player gets in Step e is at most 2n . Thus
if a player does not get the good, then his utility is at most 2n . This is so because we aim at achieving
the second belief revenue benchmark up to only an additive . If we are willing to give up an  fraction
of the revenue benchmark, then each player could receive a reward proportional to the second highest
bid in the mechanism, so that his utility may still be very high even if he does not get the good. For
instance, we can use δi =
maxj 6=a vj
4n
[
vi
1+vi
+ 1−ei
(1+V )2
]
.
8 Analysis of The Second-Belief Mechanism
Theorem 3. For any  ∈ (0, 1], n, and V , M,n,V conservatively strictly implements 2nd −  for C Vn .
Proof. Arbitrarily fix  ∈ (0, 1], n, V , C = (n, V, θ,B) ∈ C Vn , and a strategy profile s. Denoting M,n,V by
M for short, it suffices for us to prove that, if s is conservatively strictly rational in the game (C,M), then
REV (M(s)) ≥ 2nd(B)− . (11)
Letting si , (ei, vi) for each i, we start by proving three claims.
Claim 1. ∀ player i and ∀ type ti ∈ {0, . . . , V } of i, if si ∈ S(ti) then vi ≥ ti.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume for sake of contradiction that si ∈ S(ti) and vi < ti. We shall show that si
is strictly ti-S-dominated by s
′
i = (0, ti). By definition, this implies si 6∈ S(ti), a contradiction. For this
purpose, letting s′−i be an arbitrary strategy subprofile of −i, it suffices to show that
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) < ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)).
To do so, let s′j = (e
′
j , v
′
j) for each j 6= i. Moreover, in the plays of (si, s′−i) and (s′i, s′−i) respectively, let
(a, P ) and (a′, P ′) be the outcomes, and δi and δ′i the rewards that player i receives in Step e.
Because vi ≥ 0 by the construction ofM and vi < ti by hypothesis, we have that ti ≥ 1 andM does not
halt in Step b in the play of (s′i, s
′
−i). Below we shall distinguish two exhaustive cases, according to the play
of (si, s
′
−i).
Case 1. M halts in Step b in the play of (si, s′−i).
In this case, by the construction of M we have vi = 0, v′j = 0 for each j 6= i, and
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) =
ti
n
.
Now we consider the play of (s′i, s
′
−i). Because ti ≥ 1 > 0 = maxj 6=i v′j , we have a′ = i,
P ′i = max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δ′i = 12 − δ′i, and δ′i = 4n
[
ti
1+ti
+ 1
(1+V )2
]
> 0. Accordingly,
ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)) = ti − P ′i = ti −
1
2
+ δ′i > ti −
1
2
≥ ti
n
,
where the second inequality holds because ti ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2. Therefore ui(ti, (si, s′−i)) < ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i))
as desired.
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Case 2. M does not halt in Step b in the play of (si, s′−i).
In this case, by the construction of M we have
δi =

4n
[
vi
1 + vi
+
1− ei
(1 + V )2
]
and δ′i =

4n
[
ti
1 + ti
+
1
(1 + V )2
]
.
Accordingly,
δ′i − δi =

4n
[
ti
1 + ti
− vi
1 + vi
]
+

4n
[
1− (1− ei)
(1 + V )2
]
=

4n
[
ti − vi
(1 + ti)(1 + vi)
+
ei
(1 + V )2
]
> 0,
where the inequality holds because vi < ti by hypothesis and ei ≥ 0 by the construction ofM. Thus we
have
δ′i > δi.
Below we distinguish three exhaustive sub-cases.
Sub-case 2.1. a′ 6= i.
In this sub-case, we also have a 6= i, because vi < ti. Accordingly, Pi = −δi and P ′i = −δ′i, and thus
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) = δi and ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)) = δ
′
i. Therefore ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) < ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)) as desired.
Sub-case 2.2. a′ = i and a = i.
In this sub-case, we have P ′i = max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δ′i and Pi = max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δi. Because
δ′i > δi, we further have Pi > P
′
i , which implies ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) = ti − Pi < ti − P ′i = ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i))
as desired.
Sub-case 2.3. a′ = i and a 6= i.
In this sub-case, we have P ′i = max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δ′i, Pi = −δi, and ti ≥ maxj 6=i v′j . As ti ≥ 1
by hypothesis, we further have ti ≥ max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j}. Accordingly, ui(ti, (si, s′−i)) = −Pi = δi <
δ′i ≤ (ti −max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j}) + δ′i = ti − P ′i = ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i)) as desired.
In sum, ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) < ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)) for any s
′
−i, and thus si is strictly ti-S-dominated by s
′
i, contra-
dicting the fact that si ∈ S(ti). Therefore Claim 1 holds. 
Claim 2. ∀ player i and ∀ type ti ∈ {1, . . . , V } of i, if si = (1, ti) then si 6∈ S(ti).
Proof of Claim 2. By definition, it suffices for us to show that si is strictly ti-S-dominated by strategy
s′i = (0, ti). For this purpose, arbitrarily fixing a strategy subprofile s
′
−i of −i, it suffices to show that
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) < ui(ti, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)).
To do so, first notice that M does not halt in Step b in either the play of (si, s′−i) or the play of (s′i, s′−i),
because ti ≥ 1 by hypothesis. The analysis below is very similar to Case 2 of Claim 1. Indeed, in the plays
of (si, s
′
−i) and (s
′
i, s
′
−i) respectively, we denote by δi and δ
′
i the rewards that player i receives in Step e, and
by (a, P ) and (a′, P ′) the final outcomes. Letting s′j = (e
′
j , v
′
j) for each player j 6= i, we have
δ′i =

4n
[
ti
1 + ti
+
1
(1 + V )2
]
>

4n
· ti
1 + ti
= δi,
and we distinguish three cases as before:
• If a′ 6= i, then a 6= i as well, and we have
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) = −Pi = δi < δ′i = −P ′i = ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i)).
• If a′ = i and a = i, then Pi = max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δi > max{12 ,maxj 6=i v′j} − δ′i = P ′i , and we have
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) = ti − Pi < ti − P ′i = ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i)).
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• Otherwise, we have that a′ = i and a 6= i, which implies
ui(ti, (si, s
′
−i)) = −Pi = δi < δ′i ≤ (ti −max{
1
2
,max
j 6=i
v′j}) + δ′i = ti − P ′i = ui(ti, (s′i, s′−i)).
In sum, si is strictly ti-S-dominated by s
′
i, and Claim 2 holds. 
Claim 3. ∀ player i, if si is conservatively strictly rational in game (C,M), then vi ≥ smpi.
Proof of Claim 3. Assume for sake of contradiction that si is conservatively strictly rational and vi < smpi.
By definition we have si ∈ S(θi), and thus by Claim 1 we have
vi ≥ θi. (12)
Let s′i = (1, smpi). In order to reach a contradiction it suffices for us to prove the following statement:
∀t ∈ Bi, ∀s′−i ∈ S(t−i), ui(θi, (si, s′−i)) < ui(θi, (s′i, s′−i)). (13)
To see why this is sufficient, notice that if s′i ∈ S(θi) then by definition Statement 13 implies that si is
conservatively strictly dominated by s′i, contradicting the hypothesis that si is conservatively strictly rational.
If s′i 6∈ S(θi), then by definition there exists a strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si) such that
∀s′−i ∈ S−i, ui(θi, (s′i, s′−i)) < ui(θi, (σi, s′−i)).
In other words, s′i is strictly dominated by σi in game (C,M). Because S(θi) is the set of strategies that
are not strictly dominated in game (C,M), by well know properties of strict dominance we have that there
exists a strategy σ′i ∈ ∆(S(θi)) such that s′i is strictly dominated by σ′i in game (C,M), that is, the following
statement holds:
∀s′−i ∈ S−i, ui(θi, (s′i, s′−i)) < ui(θi, (σ′i, s′−i)). (14)
Because S(t−i) ⊆ S−i for each t ∈ Bi, Statements 13 and 14 together imply that
∀t ∈ Bi,∀s′−i ∈ S(t−i), ui(θi, (si, s′−i)) < ui(θi, (σ′i, s′−i)),
which by definition implies that si is conservatively strictly dominated by σ
′
i, again contradicting the hypoth-
esis that si is conservatively strictly rational.
Below we shall prove Statement 13. Arbitrarily fixing a type profile t ∈ Bi and a strategy subprofile
s′−i ∈ S(t−i), it suffices to show
ui(θi, (si, s
′
−i)) < ui(θi, (s
′
i, s
′
−i)).
To do so, let ?(t) = argmaxj tj with ties broken lexicographically. Because t ∈ Bi and smpi = mint∈Bi maxj tj ,
we have
t?(t) ≥ smpi.
Let s′j = (e
′
j , v
′
j) for each j 6= i. Because s′?(t) ∈ S(t?(t)), by Claim 1 we have that
v′?(t) ≥ t?(t).
Accordingly, the following sequence of inequalities holds:
v′?(t) ≥ t?(t) ≥ smpi > vi ≥ θi ≥ 0, (15)
where the third inequality holds by hypothesis, and the fourth is just Equation 12. By Sequence 15 we have
v′?(t) > 0, thusM does not halt in Step b in the play of (si, s′−i) or in the play of (s′i, s′−i). Below we consider
the outcomes of the two plays.
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Let (a, P ) and (a′, P ′) be the final outcomes of (si, s′−i) and (s
′
i, s
′
−i) respectively. By Sequence 15 we
have v′?(t) > vi, thus ?(t) 6= i. If v′?(t) > smpi, then by the construction of M we have that (e′?(t), v′?(t)) is
ordered before (1, smpi), and thus is also ordered before (ei, vi). If v
′
?(t) = smpi, then by Sequence 15 we
have v′?(t) = t?(t). Also by Sequence 15 we have t?(t) ≥ 1. Thus by Claim 2 we have e′?(t) = 0, which implies
that (e′?(t), v
′
?(t)) is ordered before (1, smpi), and thus is also ordered before (ei, vi). Accordingly, no matter
what v′?(t) is, we always have
a 6= i and a′ 6= i,
therefore the utilities of player i only depend on his rewards in Step e in both plays.
Let δi and δ
′
i be the rewards that player i receives in Step e, in the plays of (si, s
′
−i) and (s
′
i, s
′
−i)
respectively. We have
δ′i − δi =

4n
· smpi
1 + smpi
− 
4n
[
vi
1 + vi
+
1− ei
(1 + V )2
]
=

4n
[
smpi − vi
(1 + smpi)(1 + vi)
− 1− ei
(1 + V )2
]
≥ 
4n
[
1
(1 + smpi)(1 + vi)
− 1
(1 + V )2
]
>

4n
[
1
(1 + smpi)2
− 1
(1 + V )2
]
≥ 
4n
[
1
(1 + V )2
− 1
(1 + V )2
]
= 0,
where the first inequality holds because vi < smpi and ei ≥ 0, the second because vi < smpi, and the last
because smpi ≤ V . Accordingly we have
δ′i > δi,
which implies
ui(θi, (si, s
′
−i)) = δi < δ
′
i = ui(θi, (s
′
i, s
′
−i))
as we wanted to show. Therefore Claim 3 holds. 
Now we are ready to prove that if s is conservatively strictly rational then Inequality 11 holds, which
implies Theorem 3. Because s is conservatively strictly rational, by Claim 3 we have that
vi ≥ smpi for each i. (16)
If M halts in Step b, then vi = 0 for each i, which together with Equation 16 implies that smpi = 0 for
each i, and thus 2nd(B) = 0. Accordingly,
REV (M(s)) = 0 = 2nd(B) > 2nd(B)− .
Otherwise, by Equation 16 we have that the second highest value in {v1, . . . , vn} is greater than or equal
to the second highest value in {smp1, . . . , smpn}, which is precisely 2nd(B). By the construction of M we
have that for each reward δi in Step e,
δi =

4n
[
vi
1 + vi
+
1− ei
(1 + V )2
]
<

4n
· (1 + 1) = 
2n
.
Letting (a, P ) be the outcome of s, we have: (1) Pa = max{12 ,maxj 6=a vj} − δa, (2) ∀i 6= a, Pi = −δi,
and (3) maxj 6=a vj is the second highest value in {v1, . . . , vn}, which implies max{12 ,maxj 6=a vj} ≥ 2nd(B).
Accordingly,
REV (M(s)) = Pa +
∑
i 6=a
Pi ≥ 2nd(B)− δa −
∑
i 6=a
δi > 2
nd(B)− n · 
2n
> 2nd(B)− .
Therefore Theorem 3 holds. Q.E.D.
16
Remark. If a player’s belief is not correct, then according to mechanism M his utility may be negative
and he may be “shocked” when seeing the final outcome. But when the game is played he believes that his
utility will be non-negative and thus behaves as specified by our solution concept, in particular by Claim 3.
9 Three Concerns About the Second-Belief Mechanism “in Practice”
A concern raised about the second-belief mechanism is that “ rewards” may not be enough motivation for
the players to participate. When the relevant players opt to “stay at home”, the second-belief benchmark
cannot be guaranteed, and thus the second-price mechanism might in practice generate higher revenue.
Let us have a closer look. First, it should be appreciated that any rational player prefers a positive utility,
no matter how small, to 0 utility, which is the utility he would receive if he opted out of the auction, both
in the second-belief and the second-price mechanism. (Saying otherwise requires an alternative notion of
rationality.14) Second, as we have already observed, conservative beliefs are implicit in any context, whether
or not a designer tries to leverage them. Accordingly, to compare properly the second-belief and the second-
price mechanism, one should consider the same, underlying, conservative belief profile B. Consider a player
i who does not believe that his valuation is the highest. Then i concludes that he will receive “ utility”
under the second-belief mechanism, and 0 utility under the second-price one. Therefore, according to any
reasonable (traditional or not) notion of rationality, if i chooses to opt out in the second-belief mechanism,
he should also opt out in the second-price mechanism. In neither mechanism, therefore, can player i be relied
upon to achieve the corresponding revenue benchmark. Consider now a player i who believes that he might
be the one with the highest valuation. Then, in either mechanism, it is dominant for him to participate in
the auction. (In particular, in the second-belief mechanism, opting out is strictly dominated by (0, θi), which
always has positive utility.) Accordingly, if i chooses to participate the second-price mechanism, he should
also participate the second-belief one.
Another (related) concern was raised for the case in which the players only have very unprecise external
beliefs. In this case, while the revenue generated by the second-price mechanism is equal to the second-highest
valuation, 2nd(θ), the one generated by the second-belief mechanism is “2nd(θ) − .” Again, such a concern
is based on an “unfair” comparison. The second-belief mechanism works no matter what beliefs the seller
may have about the quality of the players’ conservative beliefs, and insists on guaranteeing strictly positive
utilities to the players (when they play conservatively and not all players have value 0). By contrast, the
second-price mechanism only guarantees that the players’ utilities are ≥ 0, and thus cannot guarantee the
participation of players who believe that they do not have the highest valuation. Accordingly, for the seller
to gain an extra  in revenue by adopting the second-price mechanism instead of the second-belief one, it
is necessary that he has enough information about the players: namely, he must be sure that each player
believes that he might be the one with the highest valuation. In absence of this information, to guarantee
the participation of all players, the second-price mechanism must be modified so as to provide some form of
“ rewards” as well, and thus will miss its target revenue in its purest form. To be sure, the second-price
mechanism can be perturbed so that all players with non-zero valuations get strictly positive utilities and it
is strictly dominant for them to participate. But then the revenue of the seller becomes “2nd(θ)− ” as well.
A third concern raised is that the second-belief mechanism may miss its benchmark because its players
may prefer decreasing their opponents’ utilities to increasing their own ones. Indeed, if (1) the player with
the highest valuation is player i, (2) i believes that he is the player with the highest valuation, (3) i believes
that θi ≥ 2nd(B), and (4) i further believes that 2nd(B) > 2nd(θ), then, when all other players act rationally,
by sufficiently underbidding his own valuation —e.g., by bidding (0, 0)— player i will cause another player
14To be sure, such alternative notions exist: in particular, -Nash equilibrium. Note however that any mechanism which, like
ours, achieves a revenue benchmark —at least in some contexts— close to the highest true valuation, must rely on the traditional
notion of rationality, instead of any -alternative. This is so because, when the revenue benchmark equals the highest valuation
minus , by definition the sum of the players’ utilities must be at most . Therefore any -alternative notion of rationality will
make the players indifferent between participating and opting out. And when players opt out, the mechanism cannot guarantee
its desired benchmark.
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to receive negative utility. However, let us emphasize that, while leveraging the players’ external beliefs, we
continue to use the classical utility function for single-good auctions: namely, the utility of every player equals
his true valuation minus the price he pays if he wins the good, and 0 minus the price he pays otherwise.
Under such a classical utility function, the second-belief mechanism achieves its benchmark at every rational
play. The concern about a player having a different type of preference is therefore out of the model.
10 Future Directions
We believe that much work can be done in leveraging the players’ set-theoretic beliefs.
Indeed, in a very recent work with Rafael Pass, we exhibit mechanisms that guarantee even higher revenue
benchmarks (based on the players’ set-theoretic higher-order beliefs), under different solution concepts.
Beyond single-good auctions, we plan to investigate what social choice correspondences can be imple-
mented by leveraging the players’ set-theoretic beliefs in other strategic settings.
Finally, we should investigate models where some of the players’ beliefs are set-theoretic, and some are
probabilistic, but without assuming the correctness of such beliefs, let alone their being common knowledge.
Appendix
A Extra Fragility of Implementation at Some Ex-Post/VeryWeakly Dom-
inant Equilibria
The notion of ex-post equilibrium, originally defined for Bayesian settings, is naturally extended to our
set-theoretic setting.
Definition 8. Given a class of contexts C and a mechanism M , an ex-post equilibrium s is a profile of
functions, where each si maps player i’s conservative beliefs to his (possibly mixed) strategies, such that: ∀
context C ∈ C , denoting by B the belief profile of C and by s(B) the strategy profile (s1(B1), . . . , sn(Bn)),
s(B) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (C,M).
If the range of each si only consists of pure strategies, then we say that s is a pure ex-post equilibrium.
Note that ex-post equilibrium and very weakly dominant equilibrium are different notions.15
Definition 9. A mechanism M implements at some ex-post equilibrium a social choice correspondence
F for a class of contexts C if, ∃ an ex-post equilibrium s such that, ∀ context C ∈ C , denoting by B the
belief profile of C, we have that M(s(B)) ∈ F (B).
If s is the ex-post equilibrium required above, then we further say that M implements F at s.
Definition 10. A mechanism M implementing a social choice correspondence F at some ex-post equilibrium
for a class of contexts C is fragile if, ∀ ex-post equilibrium s at which M implements F , ∃ another ex-post
equilibrium s′ satisfying the following two properties:
(1) ∃ a player i and a conservative belief Bi of i such that s′ and s differ only at Bi;16 and
(2) ∀ context C = (n,Ω,Θ, u, θ′,B′) in C such that B′i = Bi, we have that M(s′(B′)) 6∈ F (B′).
(The notion of implementation at some very weakly dominant equilibrium and the corresponding notion
of fragility are similarly defined.)
15If for each player i and each strategy si there exists Bi such that si(Bi) = si, then for each B the strategy profile s(B) is
also a very weakly dominant equilibrium. But otherwise not.
16That is, si(Bi) 6= s′i(Bi); si(B′i) = s′i(B′i) for all B′i 6= Bi; and sj = s′j for all j 6= i.
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Theorem 4. ∀ ∈ (0, 1] and ∀ V > 6/2, any reasonable deterministic mechanism implementing 2nd for
DV2 at some pure ex-post/very weakly dominant equilibrium is fragile.
Theorem 5. ∀ ∈ (12 , 1] and ∀ V > d 1−1/2e, any reasonable mechanism implementing 2nd for DV2 at some
ex-post/very weakly dominant equilibrium is fragile.
We prove Theorems 4 and 5 for ex-post equilibrium only, as the proof for very weakly dominant equilibrium
is almost the same. (Notice that the lower-bound of V in Theorem 4 depends on 2 rather than being linear
in  as in the other impossibility results. This is not a crucial difference, and is only because in the proof of
Theorem 4 we require that player 2’s true valuation is > 1, instead of ≥ 0 as typically assumed for auctions.)
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Let  be a value in (0, 1], V an integer greater than 6/2, and M a reasonable deterministic mechanism
implementing 2nd for DV2 at some pure ex-post equilibrium s. Further, let
• θ∗2 be a positive integer such that 3θ∗2/2 < V , and
• B∗2 = {(x, θ∗2) : x ≥ d3θ∗2/2e}.
Notice that the desired θ∗2 exists because V > 6/2. Notice also that there exists some context in DV2 with
player 2’s conservative belief being B∗2 .
We prove that there exists another pure ex-post equilibrium s′ such that:
(1) s and s′ differ only at the conservative belief B∗2 of player 2; and
(2) for every context C = (n, V, θ,B) ∈ DV2 with B2 = B∗2 , REV (M(s′(B))) < 2nd(B).
To do so, we analyze two (classes of) related games G and G′. Again to clarify the game to which a given
quantity refers, we shall use the superscripts G and G′.
G = (C,M), where C = (2, V, θ,B) is an arbitrary context in DV2 with B2 = B
∗
2 .
In G we have that smp1 ≥ θ1 and smp2 = d3θ∗2/2e. Because C has correct conservative beliefs, we have
θ1 ≥ d3θ∗2/2e, θ2 = θ∗2, and θ ∈ B1.
Letting (a, P ) = M(s(B)), we claim (and prove later) that the following (in)equalities hold:
(g) 2nd(B) ≥ 3θ∗2/2, REV (a, P ) ≥ 3θ∗2/, a = 1, 3θ∗2/ ≤ P1 ≤ θ1, and P2 ≤ 0.
G′ = (C ′,M), where C ′ = (2, V, θ′,B′) with θ′ = θ, B′1 = B1, and B′2 = {(x, θ2) : x ≥ d2θ∗2/e}.
Notice that C ′ ∈ DV2 . In G′ we have that smp′1 ≥ θ′1 ≥ d3θ∗2/2e and smp′2 = d2θ∗2/e. Letting (a′, P ′) =
M(s(B′)), we claim that the following (in)equalities hold:
(g′) 2nd(B′) ≥ 2θ∗2/, REV (a′, P ′) ≥ 2θ∗2, a = 1, 2θ∗2 ≤ P ′1 ≤ θ′1, and P ′2 ≤ 0.
Let us explain why all 5 (in)equalities in (g) hold. The first follows because 2nd(B) = smp2. The second
follows from our hypothesis of M and s. Now notice that, because M satisfies the opt-out condition and
s(B) is an equilibrium of G, we have uG1 (a, P ) ≥ 0 and uG2 (a, P ) ≥ 0. Accordingly, because there is only
a single good, at most one player can pay a positive price. That is, the revenue must come from a single
player, and must be at least 3θ∗2/. Because this player has to get non-negative utility, he must be player 1,
and must get the good. Thus the other (in)equalities of (g) hold. The (in)equalities of (g′) hold for similar
reasons.
We construct the desired pure ex-post equilibrium s′ as follows: s′2(B∗2) = s2(B′2), and s′ coincides with
s everywhere else. By construction, for any context C ′′ ∈ DV2 with conservative belief profile B′′ such that
B′′2 6= B∗2 , s′(B′′) = s(B′′), and thus s′(B′′) is a Nash equilibrium of (C ′′,M). Because context C is a
generic context in DV2 with player 2’s conservative belief being B
∗
2 , it remains for us to prove that s
′ satisfies
the following properties:
(A) s′(B) is a Nash equilibrium of G; and
(B) REV (M(s′(B))) < 3θ∗2/.
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Proof of Property A Because s′1 = s1, to establish Property A, it suffices to show that (s1(B1), s′2(B2))
is a Nash equilibrium of G.
By construction, player 1’s true type is the same in C and C ′, and the same is true for player 2’s true
type. Therefore we have that
uG
′
1 (·) = uG1 (·) and uG
′
2 (·) = uG2 (·).
Accordingly, (s1(B1), s′2(B2)) is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of G′. Because,
again by construction, player 1’s conservative belief is the same in C and C ′, we further have
s1(B
′
1) = s1(B1),
and thus
(s1(B1), s
′
2(B2)) = (s1(B
′
1), s
′
2(B
∗
2)) = (s1(B
′
1), s2(B
′
2)) = s(B
′).
Because s(B′) is a Nash equilibrium of G′, (s1(B1), s′2(B2)) is a Nash equilibrium of G′ and thus of G, and
Property A holds. 
Proof of Property B Because s′(B) = (s1(B1), s′2(B2)) = s(B′), to establish Property B, it suffices to
prove that
REV (M(s(B′))) < 3θ∗2/. (17)
Because the last inequality in (g′) states that at the strategy profile s(B′) the revenue is at most the price
paid by player 1, P ′1, it actually suffices to show that
P ′1 < 3θ
∗
2/. (18)
We prove Inequality 18 by contradiction. Assume P ′1 ≥ 3θ∗2/, and consider the auxiliary game G′′.
G′′ = (C ′′,M), where C ′′ = (2, V, θ′′,B′′) with
θ′′ = (d2θ∗2/e, θ2), B′′1 = {(θ′′1 , x) : (θ1, x) ∈ B1}, and B′′2 = B′2.
Notice that C ′′ ∈ DV2 . In G′′ we have that smp′′1 ≥ smp′′2 = d2θ∗2/e. Letting (a′′, P ′′) = M(s(B′′)), similar
to what we have seen before, the following (in)equalities hold:
(g′′) 2nd(B′′) ≥ 2θ∗2/, REV (a′′, P ′′) ≥ 2θ∗2, a′′ = 1, 2θ∗2 ≤ P ′′1 ≤ θ′′1 = d2θ∗2/e, and P ′′2 ≤ 0.
Let us now prove that, in game G′, player 1 can profitably deviate from the equilibrium s(B′) by playing
s1(B′′1 ) instead of s1(B′1). Indeed, B′′2 = B′2 implies that s2(B′′2 ) = s2(B′2), and thus M(s1(B′′1 ), s2(B′2)) =
M(s(B′′)) = (a′′, P ′′). According to (g′′), in the outcome (a′′, P ′′) player 1 still wins the good, but pays
≤ d2θ∗2/e rather than ≥ 3θ∗2/.
Because θ∗2 is an integer > 1, we have that 3θ∗2/− 2θ∗2/ > 1. Therefore 3θ∗2/ > d2θ∗2/e, implying that
player 1 can indeed benefit by deviating from s1(B′1) to s1(B′′1 ) in equilibrium s(B′). Thus, assuming that
Inequality 18 is false contradicts the fact that s(B′) in an equilibrium of G′. The contradiction establishes
Inequality 17 and thus Property B. 
Therefore Theorem 4 holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Let  be a value in (1/2, 1], V an integer greater than d 1−1/2e, and M a reasonable mechanism implementing
2nd for DV2 at some ex-post equilibrium s. To prove that M is fragile, let H be an integer such that
V ≥ H > 1
− 1/2 .
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Similar to previous proofs, we are going to consider different contexts and thus different games, and we use
superscripts to clarify the game to which a given quantity refers.
Let B∗2 = {(H, 0)}. Notice that there exist some contexts in DV2 with player 2’s conservative belief being
B∗2 —indeed, these are contexts where player 1’s true valuation is H, player 2’s true valuation is 0, and player
2 believes that player 1’s true valuation is H (that is, player 1’s external belief are the only undetermined
part). Our goal is to show that there exists another ex-post equilibrium s′ such that:
(1) s′ and s differ only at the conservative belief B∗2 of player 2; and
(2) for every context C = (n, V, θ,B) ∈ DV2 with B2 = B∗2 , REV (M(s′(B))) < 2nd(B).
To do so, we analyze two (classes of) related games, G and G′, as follows.
G = (C,M), where C = (2, V, θ,B) is an arbitrary context in DV2 with B2 = B
∗
2 .
In G we have that θ = (H, 0), θ ∈ B1, smp1 = smp2 = H, and thus 2nd(B) = H no matter what B1 is.
G′ = (C ′,M), where C ′ = (2, V, θ′,B′) with
θ′ = (1, 0), B′1 = {(1, x) : (H,x) ∈ B1}, and B′2 = {(x, 0) : x ≥ 1}.
Notice that C ′ ∈ DV2 and 2nd(B′) = 1.
Let us now analyze game G′. Let ω′ = M(s(B′)), and p′i and EP
′
i respectively be the probability that
player i gets the good and the expected price that player i pays according to ω′. By the opt-out condition
and our hypothesis, we have
uG
′
1 (ω
′) = p′1 − EP ′1 ≥ 0, uG
′
2 (ω
′) = −EP ′2 ≥ 0, and EP ′1 + EP ′2 ≥ 2nd(B′) = .
Combining these three inequalities, we have
p′1 ≥ EP ′1 ≥ − EP ′2 ≥ . (19)
We construct the desired ex-post equilibrium s′ as follows:
s′2(B
∗
2) = s2(B
′
2),
and s′ coincides with s everywhere else. By construction, for any context C ′′ ∈ DV2 with conservative belief
profile B′′ such that B′′2 6= B∗2 , s′(B′′) = s(B′′), and thus s′(B′′) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (C ′′,M).
Because C is a generic context in DV2 with player 2’s conservative belief being B
∗
2 , it remains for us to prove
that s′ satisfies the following properties:
(A) s′(B) is a Nash equilibrium of G; and
(B) REV (M(s′(B))) < H.
Proof of Property A. We do so by introducing another (auxiliary) game G′′.
G′′ = (C ′′,M), where C ′′ = (2, V, θ′′,B′′) with θ′′ = θ, B′′1 = B1, and B′′2 = B′2.
Notice that C ′′ ∈ DV2 , and that C ′′ differs from C only at player 2’s belief and from C ′ only at player 1’s
true valuation (of course B′′1 has to be consistent with θ′′1 which is H, and thus differs from B′1, but player
1’s external belief does not change).
Because s′1 = s1, B2 = B∗2 , B1 = B′′1 , s′2(B∗2) = s2(B′2), and B′2 = B′′2 , we have that
s′(B) = (s′1(B1), s
′
2(B2)) = (s1(B1), s
′
2(B
∗
2)) = (s1(B
′′
1 ), s2(B
′
2)) = (s1(B
′′
1 ), s2(B
′′
2 )) = s(B
′′).
Because s(B′′) is a Nash equilibrium of G′′ by the definition of s, s′(B) is also a Nash equilibrium of G′′.
Because G and G′′ have the same true valuation profile, s′(B) is a Nash equilibrium of G, and Property A
holds.
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Proof of Property B. Notice that in game G,
uG1 (M(s(B
′))) = uG1 (ω
′) = p′1H − EP ′1 ≥ p′1H − p′1 ≥ (H − 1),
where the inequalities hold by Equation 19.
Because s′(B) = (s1(B1), s′2(B∗2)) = (s1(B1), s2(B′2)) is a Nash equilibrium of G, we have that
uG1 (M(s1(B1), s2(B
′
2))) ≥ uG1 (M(s(B′))) ≥ (H − 1),
and
uG2 (M(s1(B1), s2(B
′
2))) ≥ uG2 (M(s1(B1), out2)) = 0.
Let ω′′ = M(s1(B1), s2(B′2)), and p′′i and EP
′′
i respectively be the probability that player i gets the good
and the expected price that player i pays according to ω′′. Combining with the above two lines of equations,
we have
uG1 (ω
′′) = p′′1H − EP ′′1 ≥ (H − 1) and uG2 (ω′′) = −EP ′′2 ≥ 0.
Combining with the facts that 0 ≤ p′′1 ≤ 1, 1/2 <  ≤ 1, and H > 1−1/2 , we have
REV (M(s′(B))) = REV (M(s1(B1), s2(B′2))) = EP
′′
1 + EP
′′
2 ≤ EP ′′1 ≤ p′′1H − (H − 1) = H(p′′1 − +

H
)
≤ H(1− + 1
H
) < H(1− + − 1/2) = H/2 < H.
Therefore Property B holds, and so does Theorem 5.
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